Open Borders, Interrupted
A while ago, Charles Amos and I had a debate across substack on whether there can be a libertarian case for border restrictions. I resume that debate here! For a time, I thought I should concede on one point (see below), but on balance I’ll be broadly sticking to my guns.
Amos presented the libertarian case that any border restrictions are restrictions on people’s right to move where they choose (providing they don’t obstruct others’ rights in the process).
I hit back arguing that there can be a valid libertarian case for open borders. I suggested that since immigration requires use of public infrastructure that can be plausibly held to be owned by either much of the population at large or the state, then it figures that the state could rightfully regulate access to this infrastructure on behalf of the populace.
I still broadly hold that that case is correct - where we can say that infrastructure was built by population on a national scale, particularly through the state, then it makes sense that the state either has a right (by virtue of its ownership of the infrastructure) or a duty (given the populace’s joint ownership of the infrastructure) to regulate access to public infrastructure in keeping with the population’s wishes.
Amos suggests that a lot of what we might call public infrastructure are public rights of way - let me concede this. To show that this leads to a lack of restricting migration, however, is equivalent to showing that we could not restrict access to a country without restricting access to public rights of way - which doesn’t seem obvious to me. The bulk of roads and railway lines etc are not along public rights of way.
Amos argues that my line of reasoning can be refuted by considering the absurd implication that this would suggest we restrict children from accessing public infrastructure - but children of permanent residents of a country are the heirs of its infrastructure.
He also frames my case that the state could be the entity managing borders as resting on an inaccurate view of how public infrastructure is managed. In the UK, council tax funds a lot of local government activity, which is then used for the maintenance of public infrastructure. However, I would contend that ultimately all of these things are fundamentally guaranteed by central government. Central government delegates to local government the task of public infrastructure and grants local government the revenues from council tax that is - like all other taxes - in existence by virtue of parliament’s assent. All public infrastructure has central government organisation at its root - and is therefore ultimately the fruit of the nation’s labour as a whole.
Of course, another matter here is relevant - the one that had me nearly conceding. Is it true that restrictions on access to public infrastructure are always equivalent to restrictions on migration? We can ‘imagine’ people coming to beaches and attempting to enter a country through them. Whilst some stretches of beach are public infrastructure in the sense that they have been shaped by the efforts of public bodies and domestic volunteers - whether for defence, prevention of erosion, or formation of recreation spaces - there are spaces of beach which are pretty untampered.
Would it then be unjust - under a libertarian view - to restrict people’s access to these spaces? I suggest that it is a moot point practically however. Because such people then have to either a) trespass over private property (which we say the state ought to prevent where it represents a threat), or b) use public infrastructure.
The case about public infrastructure therefore remains relevant: there can - when we get to the practicalities - be a libertarian case for border restrictions.
Why do we respect property rights so much in the first place? I like the Lockean case for property rights - that when you build new things from resources not previously owned or owned by you, you own the produce from your efforts. However, we must accept that in practice we do not live in a pure world where all of what we respect as people’s property ultimately derives from such situations. A huge amount of ownership - in the sense of who now has control over property - stems from forced transfers, e.g., invasions and slavery.
Ultimately, I do not think respect for property rights in practice can rely solely on a Lockean (or other) ideal. We have to appeal to a sort of property rights fictionalism - the idea that property rights have weight, because the alternative is worse. It is true in the world today that most people’s property is, for the most part, non-negligibly the result of their and/or their ancestors’ labour. It is also true that respect for property allows people to gain some legally respected independence and it allows for market mechanisms to work out. We gain a huge deal from having legally protected property rights - and they are not wholly illegitimate from a Lockean perspective. We merely have to adopt a kind of fictionalism to make up for the gap between the Lockean ideal and the imperfect reality.
How much scope does this then give for state interference in property? Once we accept that property ownership in practice doesn’t entirely match to philosophical ideals, this opens the door to arguments about where the state can legitimately intervene. I think this can be limited on fictionalist grounds: if the state has license to intervene too much, then it does not have checks on it whims and it stands likely to reduce social welfare through its clumsy actions.
Nonetheless, that doesn’t say too much about precisely where we should draw the line. I’ll leave for your ruminations here.